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Abstract—Installed photo voltaic energy grew exponentially
during the last decade. One of the driving forces was the
often generous governmental support. In Belgium (Flanders) for
example, investors could acquire green power certificates worth
e450/MWh during several years. However, due to the large boom
of solar plants and hence rising subsidy cost, governments are
dropping this support (eg. e450/MWh in 2009 to e90/MWh
in 2012 for Flanders). In this paper the authors investigate if
solar energy can become more profitable if forces are joined in
a Commercial Virtual Power Plant to sell the solar power on
the wholesale market. The numbers are based on the Flemish
region, however, the same procedure can be applied to other
markets as well. It turned out that for existing installations the
potential benefits are marginal due to the small share of the
energy revenue compared to the subsidy revenue in the total
income of a solar plant. However, lower subsidies and coupling
with other production resources and (flexible) consumers promise
to be more profitable, although this needs more investigation.
I. INTRODUCTION: COMMERCIAL VIRTUAL POWER
PLANTS
Commercial Virtual Power Plants (CVPP) cluster the output
from different sources to commercialize the energy in a more
profitable way. In its simplest form, it consists of installations
of a company with a multisite metering contract. If combined
in a multisite contract, these installations essentially form a
CVPP. A more advanced version would offer (semi)real-time
metering and sell the energy as one volume to a retailer.
Because of aggregating these installations, the transactions
are larger, thus better prices can be obtained. Due to their
purely economical character, these VPPs are not geographi-
cally constrained. The only limitation is the operational area
of the contracting energy retailer. A more advanced version
of a CVPP is one which is capable of selling its energy on
the stock market such as APX-ENDEX, Belpex DAM, Belpex
CIM, EPEX Spot FR, EPEX Spot DE or EMCC. In most cases,
this provides the participants a more interesting price than
that obtained on the retail market. Although on average the
price is better, the volatility is also much higher. This provides
opportunities for flexible participants. During low prices on the
stock market, Distributed Energy Resources (DER) with stor-
age can curtail the production and consumers can buy cheap
energy. During peak prices, this scenario is reversed. This
system enables small consumers and DER to participate on
the stock market. Due to the entrance fees [1], [2], minimum
transaction volume [3], [4] and extra responsibilities, this is not
possible for individual small or medium participants. Only the
portfolio effect enables them to participate on the stock market
as a group. In this paper, the authors will prove a CVPP with
only Photo Voltaic (PV) capacity is not viable under present
circumstances. However, due to the rapidly changing subsidy
schemes and combined with DER, opportunities may arise.
In section II, an introduction to wholesale market operation
is given. Section III elaborates on current solar power instal-
lations. Next, in section IV, CVPP operation is analyzed and
section V presents the conclusions.
II. WHOLESALE ENERGY TRADING
A. System balancing and energy trading
In this section, the wholesale market operation is clarified.
The numbers are based on the Belgian system, however, as
Belgium, Germany, France and The Netherlands are coupled
in one pentalateral market [5], their market situation is quite
similar [6]. Trading of energy on the wholesale market com-
prises three levels: 1) Delivery 2) Trading 3) Clearing.
The trading system provides the economic coupling of buy-
ers and sellers. The clearing system is providing an anonymous
intermediary to guarantee contract settlement and the delivery
platform ensures the needed capacity on the transmission grid.
The delivery is discussed first because technical constrains can
have a significant impact on the trading.
1) Delivery: The electricity purchased is physically trans-
fered between Acces Responsible Parties (ARP) through the
transmission grid. To provide the necessary balance between
offtake and injection, ARPs need to nominate the expected
transfer capacity the day before delivery (D-1) [7]. This
requires the ARPs to estimate the consumption and/or the
production on their access point to the transmission grid. This
estimation needs to be submitted to the system operator on
D-1 which uses this data to calculate the expected power
flows in the transmission grid. ARPs need to enter an opposite
nomination (positive and negative) in order to balance the
power on a quarter-hourly basis with an accuracy of 0.1 MW.
If those blocks do not match, the transfer is rejected [8]. As
the nominations rely on predictions, there will always be some
difference between the expected and the physical flows. As
the system needs to be in balance at every moment [9], [10],
the system operator needs to buy reserve capacity. To cover
this cost, the transmission system operator will charge the
ARPs according to their imbalances [11] on a quarter-hour
basis. This fine encourages the ARPs to correctly estimate
their positions in advance.
To deal with unforeseen circumstances, ARPs can exchange
energy on the intraday hub [12]. This enables them to coun-
teract circumstances like the breakdown of a production unit
or a change in weather forecast. However, this instrument is
strictly limited to only a few days per month to force ARPs
to correctly predict their positions. For example, the Belgian
system operator Elia enforces a 30 day ban if the intraday hub
is used in more than three consecutive days or more than five
days a month.
2) Trading: Next to the physical transfers, the energy is
traded on the energy wholesale market. Suppliers and cus-
tomers have different possibilities to trade the electricity. First
of all, they have the possibility to trade ”over the counter”.
The contract is made directly between the seller and the buyer.
The risk is entirely with the two parties. The second option
is to trade energy on exchange markets. This makes use of
standard contracts which are traded on a stock exchange. In
the exchange market there are two largely distinctive markets.
The first is the futures market. Futures are contracts to deliver
a certain quantity of electricity on a date in the future. This
is an easy way of trading large quantities of base capacity, as
these contracts are often concluded for months or years at a
time. Pricing is often coupled to the oil price.
The second option is the spot market. On this market energy
is traded close to the delivery time. The spot market has
two separate parts: the Day Ahead Market (DAM) and the
Continuous Intraday Market (CIM). Of the two the DAM is
the most used. As the name suggest, the energy is traded the
day before delivery. Sellers and buyers submit their supply
and demand curves. Once a day these are matched via an
auction process and a price for each trading hour of the
following day is determined. This ensures an anonymous and
transparent price fixing process. The CIM provides the parties
to trade energy very close to the delivery time, up to a few
minutes. As also physical acknowledgment of the grid operator
is needed, this is a limited market. This is only used to settle
large unbalance positions after gate closure on the DAM. As
a result, only a few hours a day energy is traded. From the
beginning of 2012, also the imbalance market is available.
The possibility to trade on this market is also limited as this
depends on the system state (net regulation volume). In this
paper, those markets are omitted as the are limited usable to
solar installations due to the inherently supply driven character
of solar power.
3) Clearing: Clearing provides a structural way of mitigat-
ing credit risk. By clearing via a central counterparty, the clear-
ing house becomes buyer to the original seller and seller to the
original buyer. No contractual relationship is left between the
original counterparties to a transaction. The clearing house
manages payment and delivery risks via margining, based
on the counterparties net trading position. This provides an
anonymous intermediary to guarantee contract settlement and
payment.
B. Market analysis
1) Markets: As already mentioned in section II-A, three
markets can be utilized by a CVPP. The futures market, the
spot day ahead and the spot intraday market. Each market has
its advantages. The futures market is beneficial to mitigate
risks as the prices are known from long before the actual deliv-
ery. For a solar CVPP, this is rather difficult as solar irradiation
can not be predicted years or even months beforehand. The
DAM is the second option, as the needed prediction horizon
declines to only 12-36 hours. This is a more feasible prediction
horizon, but still suffers from potential large deviations. The
intraday market is the third option, but due to the limitations
of the grid operators, its access is limited.
As a conclusion, the DAM is the most attractive way of
trading energy for uncontrollable sources. Hence, the uncer-
tainties of weather prediction need to be taken in account. In
section IV-B, the comparison is made between 100% accurate
prediction and with an uncertainty band of ±10%. Further
research on prediction uncertainty is needed to analyze the
effect of prediction error in more detail.
2) Trading prerequisites: To be allowed to trade on the
market, the party need to become a participant of the stock
exchange. The yearly admission fee for the Belpex for example
is e25.000 for one year. Reductions are available for startups
or indirect participants. The first year, a participant needs to
pay an additional entrance fee of e12.500 to gain access to
all market segments [2]. This costs need to be offset with the
extra revenues and hence impose a minimum on the traded
volume. Adittionally, the participants need to pay a variable
operational fee with regard to all the contracts concluded on
the stock market. Belpex for example charges e0,10/MWh for
DAM contracts and e0,105/MWh for contracts concluded on
the CIM. Different tariffs are available for startups.
3) Imbalance fee: Once nominations are confirmed and the
market is settled, a participant can not change its position
anymore (except for the limited possibilities of the CIM). As a
result, the actual and nominated power can differ and result in
an imbalance. As the grid operators rely on the forecast data
to guarantee operational stability, they penalize offsets. The
penalty is based on the direction (surplus or deficit) of the
ARP and the system state. If the error of the ARP is “in the
good direction”, the fine will be lower than if the imbalance
of the ARP is in the same direction as the system imbalance.
The fine is also proportional to the mismatch.
4) Market resilience: As solar power is currently regarded
as “negative consumption” by the ARPs, the PV volume is
not visible on the market volumes. Offering this extra volume
of energy on the market will trigger a price shift. The extra
traded volume will shift the offer curve and hence influence the
intersection with the demand curve. In [13], the sensitivity of
the price to changed volume is investigated. It should however
be noted that this study is also influenced by the market cou-
pling of Belpex with the neighboring markets in France (EPEX
Spot) and The Netherlands (APX-ENDEX). This enhances the
utilization of the cross border capacity and simplifies cross
border trading. As long as the Available Transfer Capacity
(ATC) is sufficient, the three markets are coupled. From 9
november 2010 on, the trilateral market coupling has been
further extended to the Central Western Europe (CWE) market
comprising Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg
and France. This enhances the resilience of the market further.
As a result, the relative small amount of solar energy will have
no significant impact on the market price.
III. SOLAR POWER ANALYSIS
A. Solar power in Flanders
This paper elaborates on the Flemish situation concerning
photovoltaic (PV) power, although the general conclusions are
valid for any developed PV market. The Flemish situation
offers an interesting case to test the feasibility of a SCVPP
because in recent years, PV power in Flanders has known
a rapid increase in total installed power as well as total
energy yield. The main drivers for this exponential growth
were the copious financial support offered by the Flemish
regional government supplemented with tax breaks provided
by the Belgian national government. Both these initiatives
were motivated by the European 2020 goals. This went along
with a drastic decrease of the cost of photovoltaic panels.
From the start of the subsidizing program of the Flemish
regional government in 2006, the yearly increase of installed
PV power has reached levels as high as 488 % in 2007 [14].
This unforeseen and overwhelming increase of total installed
PV power confronted the Flemish regional government with a
budget overrun and prompted the Flemish Minister of Energy
to drastically cut the financial aid of new PV installations,
resulting in strongly reduced levels of 13% yearly growth in
2012.
In 2011, the total installed PV power in Flanders has reached
almost 1.7GW, resulting in a energy production of more
than 991GWh that year [15]. In the first half of 2012, these
installations already produced 793GWh of energy, constituting
33% of the total renewable energy production in Flanders1.
The total power of installations is more or less evenly spread
between small private installations of less than 10kW inverter
power (53,2% of total installed power) and large industrial
installations (46,8%). Of the latter, almost two-thirds (60,1%)
consist of installations with more than 250kW power.
After the Flemish budget overrun, the subsidy mechanism
for the production of renewable energy was drastically re-
formed. The financial support provided by the government
for new renewable energy installations is now periodically
adjusted in function of installation prices and energy prices.
The goal of this reformed subsidy mechanism is to establish
profitable, but sustainable market conditions for renewable
energy production instead of the lucractive situation before.
1Not including offshore wind energy which is not under Flemish jurisdiction
Nonetheless, this radical reform coupled with the repeal of the
federal tax breaks and a new feed-in levy imposed by Flemish
grid operators has scared away many investors, resulting in the
near collapse of the Flemish market for new renewable energy
installations in general and new PV systems in particular. New
and innovative business approaches will be required in order
to still reap sufficient financial benefits of the investments in
renewable energy systems in Flanders.
B. Specific yield
One of the most important parameters in assessing the
performance of PV systems is the specific yield, which is
defined as the yield of a PV installation in a specific period
compared to the total peak power of that same installation
and is expressed in kWh/kWp. In most cases a period of a
year is chosen to determine the specific yield. The specific
yield allows one to compare the performance of PV plants
independent of the size of the plant.
In Flanders a specific yield of 850-950 kWh/kWp on
annual basis is considered conventional. There are some slight
variations depending on geography, e.g. the coastal region is
less cloudy and therefore has a slightly higher irradation. In
this paper a dataset constructed by actual measurements of
large PV plants in Flanders is used and shows a specific yield
of 992 kWh/kWp.
PV penetration in Flanders is relatively high with on average
over 16 PV installations per km2.
C. Energy sales
Flemish PV plant operators can sell their generated energy
as ’green power’ to energy suppliers for slightly better prices
than conventional ’grey power’. An inquiry among PV plant
operators revealed that green power typical sells for about
e43/MWh, while grey power sells for e40/MWh or less2
Green power produced in Flanders was excempt from
injection fees levied by distribution system operators (DSO)
by a decree issued by the Flemish government, which wanted
to support renewable energy production. However recently this
decree has been declared void by the Belgian Constitutional
Court which ruled that injection fees are a federal jurisdiction
and Flemish renewable energy producers should be levied the
same taxes as their counterparts in the rest of Belgium. DSOs
will now retroactively charge injection fees, however the exact
magnitude has yet to be determined.
D. Subsidy evolution
Financial support in Flanders for renewable energy systems
in general and PV installations in particular is divided over
different governmental levels. The most important of these
subsidy systems is the so called green power certificate (GPC)
system which provides a financial stimulus according to the
actual energy production of the PV system. There are some
other subsidy systems, e.g. tax breaks provided by the Belgian
government for private owners of PV panels and some sector
specific financial aids, e.g. the agricultural sector, which will
2In the period H2 2011-H1 2012.
not be discussed in this paper. Next to these subsidy systems
there is of course also the revenue generated by the sale of
the generated electricity.
The GPC system awards the owner of the PV plant with
a certain grant per MWh of produced energy, which is mea-
sured by a certified energy meter. These grants are awarded
independently of the plants’ size and are guaranteed for a
certion period of time. The size and elegibility of the grant
depends on the commissioning date of the installation. At the
introduction of the GPC system the grant was set at a level
of e450/MWh garuanteed for 20 years, but these figures have
recently been drastically cut [14]. The evolution of the grant
size and elegibility is shown in table I.
TABLE I: GPC support
Commissioning GPC value GPC value Elegibility
date (P ≤ 250kW ) (P > 250kW )
2006-2009 e450 e450 20 years
2010 e350 e350 20 years
H1 2011 e330 e330 20 years
Q3 2011 e300 e240 20 years
Q4 2011 e270 e150 20 years
Q1 2012 e250 e90 20 years
Q2 2012 e230 e90 20 years
July 2012 e210 e90 20 years
H2 2012 e90 e90 10 years
2013 e93 e93 10 years
IV. CVPP POSSIBILITIES
To determine the feasibility of a CVPP with only solar
energy, historical PV energy production data and Belpex
trading prices for a period of one year are examined. The
PV energy production is based on measurements of actual
PV plants in Flanders, the trading prices are provided by
Belpex. All datasets comprise the twelve months between 3
November 2011 and 3 November 2012 and contain data with
1 hour interval. With these datasets a ‘perfect’ CVPP can
be simulated, that is to say a CVPP that has 100% accurate
predictions of the day-ahead PV energy generation and without
any technical or economical limitations to provide this power
to the consumer. This means that all the generated energy
is sold at Belpex prices and no injection fees are levied.
The size of this simulated CVPP is established at 100MW
or around 11% of the combined power of all Flemish ’large’
(P ≥ 10kW ) PV plants. In the assumed time period, this
virtual plant yielded an energy production of 99,235 MWh. In
this section, the comparison will be made between five cases:
1) fixed contract, 2) 100% accurate predicted production traded
at stock prices, 3) stock market trading with 10% prediction
error 4) trading 10% less than predicted and curtailing excess
energy and 5) Use the curtailed energy to supply own control-
lable loads.
A. Comparison with fixed contract
Most PV plants operate with a contract which provides a
fixed injection fee for the duration of this contract. The average
Belpex trading fee during daylight hours for the concerned
period amounts to e51,9/MWh. A inquiry among PV plant
(a) Daily Belpex trading price [e/MWh]
(b) Daily PV energy production [MWh]
Fig. 1: Datasets
owners determined a fixed injection fee of e44/MWh is a
realistic figure for a 1-year contract in the same period. By
integrating the daily energy production (fig. 1b) and associated
daily Belpex prices (fig. 1a) for every interval in the dataset,
a financial yield of e4,833,635 is obtained. On the other
hand, the conventional fixed contract would have resulted in a
financial yield of e4,366,340 (99,235MWh x 44/MWh), which
is e467,295 less than in CVPP operation.
In both cases, this revenue is supplemented by e26,793,180
of GPCs. The sale of generated energy only contributes around
14% of the total revenue generated by this 100MW PV plant,
and the difference between fixed contract or CVPP operation
only amounts to 1,5%.
However, if the CVPP was built in the second half of 2012,
when the reformed Flemish subsidy mechanism was put in
effect, GPC revenue would fall to e8,931,060 meaning the
share of the sale of energy in the total revenue would rise
to 33%. The difference between fixed contract and CVPP
operation would now amount to 3,5%. It is clear that the CVPP
concept offers some interesting but challenging opportunities.
B. Prediction errors
The above simulation assumes the ability to predict the day-
ahead energy production of the CVPP with 100% accuracy. In
reality, several uncertainty factors will influence the exactness
of this prediction. The most influential uncertainty factors are
meteorological conditions and technical failures.
If the ARP, in this case the CVPP operator, fails to abide
to the specified day-ahead energy production, a penalty fee
dependent on the deviation has to be paid to the TSO. This
penalty is a compensation for the TSO which is responsible
for maintaining the grid balance. The penalty price is fixed
every 15 minutes and is dependent on grid conditions and the
nature of the ARP inbalance (energy production surplus or
deficit).
There is also the possibility to use the intraday market to
compensate production deficits by buying surpluses from other
ARPs. However, this is considered an exception and ARP’s can
regulatory only use this option very sparsely, e.g. no more than
three consecutive days. With this restriction the TSO wants to
limit the speculative trading that might otherwise arise on the
intraday market.
If an average day-ahead negative prediction error of 10%
(the plant performs 10% less than predicted) is assumed, the
resulting total penalty fee amounts to e448,833, reducing the
CVPP profit to e18,472 compared to fixed contract operation.
If positive prediction errors occur (the plant performs better
than predicted) it is assumed that the CVPP operator will make
a downward adjustment of the power output of the plant so
penalty fees for production surplus will be avoided. This way
a CVPP operator can build in a safety margin. This also means
the GPC revenue will be lower. In this case the CVPP operator
will generate a revenue of e28,464,133 or e2,695,375 less
than on a fixed contract.
C. Increasing profits
From the paragraphs above, it is clear that a purely ’injection
based’ CVPP offers little financial benefits while heavily
increasing operator risks. Profits are heavily dependent on the
ability to correctly forecast day-ahead energy production and
the relative share of energy sales in total plant revenue.
Another way to increase profits is to not only use the CVPP
for energy production but also for intelligent load manage-
ment. This way, the CVPP operator can safely underestimate
the day-ahead energy production of the plant and use any
excess energy production to supply to local electrical loads.
Grid inbalance and the purchase of energy for the loads is
avoided, and GPCs are awarded for the actual total energy
production. If the CVPP operator underestimates its day-ahead
production by 10% and uses the excess energy to power loads
that otherwise would have to purchase energy at Belpex prices,
the total revenue becomes e31,658,476 or e499,967 more
than on a fixed contract.
TABLE II: Comparison of different scenarios
Prices in Fixed CVPP CVPP CVPP CVPP
e1000 contract 0% err. 10% err. 10% marg. 10% err.
10% error consump.
Energy e4,366 e4,833 e4,385 e4,350 e4,350
sales
GPC e26,793 e26,793 e26,793 e24,114 e26,793
Avoided e515
purchase
Total e31,159 e31,626 e31,178 e28,464 e31,658
Margin 100% 101,5% 100,1% 91,35% 101,6%
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, the authors discussed the operation of the
Belgian energy exchange Belpex and introduced some possi-
bilities on how a Solar Virtual Power Plan could be coupled
to this system. Some simplified economic calculations were
performed to assess the viability of CVPP and the impact of
subsidy schemes and energy cost were analyzed.
The preliminary result is that a plain ’injection based’ CVPP
offers little to no financial benefits as opposed to conventional
fixed contract operation of PV plants. While revenue generated
from selling the generated power at the energy exchange is
higher, the impact of difficult-to-predict influence factors also
increases the risk of penalty fees. However, when the ’injection
based’ CVPP is supplemented by manageable electrical loads
that can sink excess generated power the economic case for a
CVPP becomes more convincing.
The authors suggest that additional research is required for
two particular topics: the day-ahead prediction accuracy for
renewable energy production based meteorological forecasts
and the technical possibilities on implementing a VPP with
other (manageable) energy production and demand side man-
agement. Due to the large inequality between the energy and
GPC revenue (tab. I), a close eye must be kept on two factors
that will make the VPP concept even more interesting: the
rising energy prices and the diminishing subsidy schemes, both
of which will open new perspectives for innovative energy
production and trading.
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